Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Approaches to Intentionality', 'The Limits of Abstraction' and 'Perception'

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25 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
9143 Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert]
10143 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
10145 Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K]
10136 Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K]
10144 Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
2986 Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
7630 Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
7632 Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
7635 Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7638 One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund]
7642 The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
7640 Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund]
7641 Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2978 Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
2984 Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
2979 Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
2987 Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
2977 All thinking has content [Lyons]
7637 Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
9144 Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
10141 Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
10135 We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K]
9142 Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert]
10137 Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K]
10138 An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K]