Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Approaches to Intentionality', 'The Identity of Indiscernibles' and 'Contextualism Contested (and reply)'

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13 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice needs a criterion of choice [Black]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Two things can only be distinguished by a distinct property or a distinct relation [Black]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
The 'property' of self-identity is uselessly tautological [Black]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
If the universe just held two indiscernibles spheres, that refutes the Identity of Indiscernibles [Black]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee]
Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
All thinking has content [Lyons]