Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reportatio', 'Truth-makers and dependence' and 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
13939 No possible evidence could decide the reality of numbers, so it is a pseudo-question [Carnap]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
17325 Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
17318 Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
13936 Questions about numbers are answered by analysis, and are analytic, and hence logically true [Carnap]
8748 Logical positivists incorporated geometry into logicism, saying axioms are just definitions [Carnap, by Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
8960 Internal questions about abstractions are trivial, and external ones deeply problematic [Carnap, by Szabó]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
17320 Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17326 The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17327 Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
17322 Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
13933 Existence questions are 'internal' (within a framework) or 'external' (concerning the whole framework) [Carnap]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
13934 To be 'real' is to be an element of a system, so we cannot ask reality questions about the system itself [Carnap]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
13938 A linguistic framework involves commitment to entities, so only commitment to the framework is in question [Carnap]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
13935 We only accept 'things' within a language with formation, testing and acceptance rules [Carnap]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
13932 Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism [Carnap]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
13937 New linguistic claims about entities are not true or false, but just expedient, fruitful or successful [Carnap]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
13940 All linguistic forms in science are merely judged by their efficiency as instruments [Carnap]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
17324 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17321 Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
17323 If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
9111 God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good [William of Ockham]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
9112 We could never form a concept of God's wisdom if we couldn't abstract it from creatures [William of Ockham]