Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Summa totius logicae', 'Intro to 'Essays on Actions and Events'' and 'Truth Rehabilitated'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson]
Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson]
Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham]
Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson]