12 ideas
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
14633 | How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson] |
14635 | An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson] |
14632 | Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson] |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
14631 | How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
9111 | God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good [William of Ockham] |
9112 | We could never form a concept of God's wisdom if we couldn't abstract it from creatures [William of Ockham] |