Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Summa totius logicae', 'Hilbert's Programme' and 'Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making'

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27 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham]
Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Gödel showed that the syntactic approach to the infinite is of limited value [Kreisel]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
The study of mathematical foundations needs new non-mathematical concepts [Kreisel]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
The natural conception of points ducks the problem of naming or constructing each point [Kreisel]