Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Function and Concept' and 'The Extended Mind'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
6806 Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
18806 Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
8490 First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8492 Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8487 Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18899 Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
4028 Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
22132 Species and genera are individual concepts which naturally signify many individuals [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
8489 The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
19743 A notebook counts as memory, if is available to consciousness and guides our actions [Clark/Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
6176 A mechanism can count as 'cognitive' whether it is in the brain or outside it [Clark/Chalmers, by Rowlands]
19741 If something in the world could equally have been a mental process, it is part of our cognition [Clark/Chalmers]
19742 Consciousness may not extend beyond the head, but cognition need not be conscious [Clark/Chalmers]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
19744 If a person relies on their notes, those notes are parted of the extended system which is the person [Clark/Chalmers]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
9947 Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
10319 An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
8488 A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
9948 Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
4972 I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
19381 The past has ceased to exist, and the future does not yet exist, so time does not exist [William of Ockham]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
8010 William of Ockham is the main spokesman for God's commands being the source of morality [William of Ockham]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
8491 The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
16679 Even an angel must have some location [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]