Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reportatio', 'The Boundary Stones of Thought' and 'Beyond Good and Evil'

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75 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Great philosophies are confessions by the author, growing out of moral intentions [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysics divided the old unified Greek world into two [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Logic doesn't have a metaphysical basis, but nor can logic give rise to the metaphysics [Rumfitt]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth [Rumfitt]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Why do we want truth, rather than falsehood or ignorance? The value of truth is a problem [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Semantics for propositions: 1) validity preserves truth 2) non-contradition 3) bivalence 4) truth tables [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
'Absolute necessity' would have to rest on S5 [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
It is the second-order part of intuitionistic logic which actually negates some classical theorems [Rumfitt]
Intuitionists can accept Double Negation Elimination for decidable propositions [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Most set theorists doubt bivalence for the Continuum Hypothesis, but still use classical logic [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
The iterated conception of set requires continual increase in axiom strength [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
A set may well not consist of its members; the empty set, for example, is a problem [Rumfitt]
A set can be determinate, because of its concept, and still have vague membership [Rumfitt]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
If the totality of sets is not well-defined, there must be doubt about the Power Set Axiom [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic is higher-order laws which can expand the range of any sort of deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic rules cannot be proved, but various lines of attack can be repelled [Rumfitt]
The case for classical logic rests on its rules, much more than on the Principle of Bivalence [Rumfitt]
If truth-tables specify the connectives, classical logic must rely on Bivalence [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence is a relation that can extended into further statements [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
Normal deduction presupposes the Cut Law [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
In specifying a logical constant, use of that constant is quite unavoidable [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Introduction rules give deduction conditions, and Elimination says what can be deduced [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truths are just the assumption-free by-products of logical rules [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Monotonicity means there is a guarantee, rather than mere inductive support [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Maybe an ordinal is a property of isomorphic well-ordered sets, and not itself a set [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Infinitesimals do not stand in a determinate order relation to zero [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Cantor and Dedekind aimed to give analysis a foundation in set theory (rather than geometry) [Rumfitt]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
Nietzsche resists nihilism through new values, for a world of becoming, without worship [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt]
The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt]
Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Medieval logicians said understanding A also involved understanding not-A [Rumfitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
We see an approximation of a tree, not the full detail [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
We shouldn't object to a false judgement, if it enhances and preserves life [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
In English 'evidence' is a mass term, qualified by 'little' and 'more' [Rumfitt]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Morality becomes a problem when we compare many moralities [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
The ranking of a person's innermost drives reveals their true nature [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
A thought comes when 'it' wants, not when 'I' want [Nietzsche]
Wanting 'freedom of will' is wanting to pull oneself into existence out of the swamp of nothingness by one's own hair [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
It is psychology which reveals the basic problems [Nietzsche]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions [Rumfitt]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
The truth grounds for 'not A' are the possibilities incompatible with truth grounds for A [Rumfitt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The most boring and dangerous of all errors is Plato's invention of pure spirit and goodness [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Nietzsche felt that Plato's views downgraded the human body and its brevity of life [Nietzsche, by Roochnik]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Noble people see themselves as the determiners of values [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche's judgement of actions by psychology instead of outcome was poisonous [Foot on Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Nature is totally indifferent, so you should try to be different from it, not live by it [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
In the earliest phase of human history only consequences mattered [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
The noble soul has reverence for itself [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue has been greatly harmed by the boringness of its advocates [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The four virtues are courage, insight, sympathy, solitude [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
In ancient Rome pity was considered neither good nor bad [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The idea of the categorical imperative is just that we should all be very obedient [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
The morality of slaves is the morality of utility [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
The greatest possibilities in man are still unexhausted [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
The thought of suicide is a great reassurance on bad nights [Nietzsche]
The freedom of the subject means the collapse of moral certainty [Nietzsche, by Critchley]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Man is the animal whose nature has not yet been fixed [Nietzsche]
Nietzsche thinks the human condition is to overcome and remake itself [Nietzsche, by Ansell Pearson]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
The great person engages wholly with life, and is happy to endlessly relive the life they created [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Only aristocratic societies can elevate the human species [Nietzsche]
A healthy aristocracy has no qualms about using multitudes of men as instruments [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democracy diminishes mankind, making them mediocre and lowering their value [Nietzsche]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good [William of Ockham]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
We could never form a concept of God's wisdom if we couldn't abstract it from creatures [William of Ockham]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christianity is Platonism for the people [Nietzsche]