40 ideas
| 2319 | Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim] |
| 9108 | From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham] |
| 18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
| 9107 | A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham] |
| 18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
| 16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach] |
| 9106 | The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham] |
| 18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
| 9113 | Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham] |
| 9110 | The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham] |
| 2317 | Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG] |
| 2310 | Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim] |
| 2315 | Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim] |
| 18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
| 2329 | Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim] |
| 18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
| 18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
| 2320 | Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim] |
| 15388 | Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham] |
| 9109 | If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham] |
| 530 | There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim] |
| 13314 | Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca] |
| 18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
| 2065 | Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim] |
| 1550 | Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim] |
| 18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
| 2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
| 2325 | It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim] |
| 2324 | Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim] |
| 2314 | Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim] |
| 2313 | Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim] |
| 2328 | The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim] |
| 2309 | Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim] |
| 2311 | Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim] |
| 2308 | Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim] |
| 2322 | Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim] |
| 2327 | Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim] |
| 2323 | Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim] |
| 18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
| 9105 | Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham] |