31 ideas
20744 | Phenomenologists say all experience is about something and is directed [Aho] |
9108 | From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham] |
9107 | A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham] |
4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach] |
9106 | The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham] |
9113 | Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham] |
9110 | The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham] |
15388 | Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham] |
9109 | If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham] |
4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
20736 | Science has to abstract out the subjective attributes of things, focusing on what is objective [Aho] |
4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
9105 | Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham] |
4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
20734 | Anxiety, nausea, guilt and absurdity shake us up, revealing our freedom and limits [Aho] |
20733 | Our 'existence' is how we create ourselves, unconstrained by any prior 'essence' [Aho] |
20753 | The self is constituted by its choices made within a social context [Aho] |
20738 | Social contracts and markets have made society seem disconnected and artificial [Aho] |
20737 | Protestantism brought the modern emphasis on inner states of the soul [Aho] |
20766 | Four Noble Truths: life is suffering, caused by attachment, it is avoidable, there is a path [Aho] |