23 ideas
13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
9108 | From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham] |
13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
9107 | A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham] |
16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach] |
7791 | The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
9106 | The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham] |
13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
9113 | Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham] |
9110 | The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham] |
13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
15388 | Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham] |
13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
9109 | If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham] |
11002 | Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read] |
13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
9105 | Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham] |