Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'The Case for Contextualism' and 'The Logic of What Might Have Been'

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38 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
6806 Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
14684 A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
14669 For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
14667 System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N]
14668 In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N]
14692 System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
14671 What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14686 S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N]
14691 S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N]
14693 The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
14670 Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
22132 Species and genera are individual concepts which naturally signify many individuals [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14678 Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14680 Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
14690 In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N]
14677 Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N]
14679 Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N]
14688 Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N]
14685 Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
14681 Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
14676 Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
14689 Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
14674 Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N]
14682 Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N]
14687 Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
14683 Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14672 Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N]
14675 Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
14673 You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
19513 A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
19514 Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose]
19515 We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose]
19510 In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose]
19516 Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
19511 If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
19381 The past has ceased to exist, and the future does not yet exist, so time does not exist [William of Ockham]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
8010 William of Ockham is the main spokesman for God's commands being the source of morality [William of Ockham]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
16679 Even an angel must have some location [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]