13 ideas
| 9108 | From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham] |
| 9107 | A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham] |
| 16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach] |
| 9106 | The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham] |
| 9113 | Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham] |
| 9110 | The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham] |
| 8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt] |
| 15388 | Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham] |
| 8503 | The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt] |
| 8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt] |
| 9109 | If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham] |
| 9105 | Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham] |
| 3284 | There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel] |