24 ideas
9108 | From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham] |
9107 | A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham] |
16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach] |
9967 | 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien] |
9106 | The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham] |
9968 | A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien] |
9965 | There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien] |
9966 | The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien] |
9963 | If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien] |
9962 | How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien] |
9964 | Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien] |
9113 | Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham] |
9110 | The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham] |
15388 | Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham] |
9969 | The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien] |
9109 | If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham] |
9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
9105 | Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham] |
9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |