Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reportatio', 'The Moral Problem' and 'Dissoi Logoi - on Double Arguments'

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31 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Anything can be acceptable in some circumstances and unacceptable in others [Anon (Diss)]
Thracians think tattooing adds to a girl's beauty, but elsewhere it is a punishment [Anon (Diss)]
Lydians prostitute their daughters to raise a dowery, but no Greek would marry such a girl [Anon (Diss)]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
How could someone who knows everything fail to act correctly? [Anon (Diss)]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Every apparent crime can be right in certain circumstances [Anon (Diss), by PG]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
It is right to lie to someone, to get them to take medicine they are reluctant to take [Anon (Diss)]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
The first priority in elections is to vote for people who support democracy [Anon (Diss)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it [Anon (Diss)]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good [William of Ockham]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
We could never form a concept of God's wisdom if we couldn't abstract it from creatures [William of Ockham]