68 ideas
14179 | The finest branch of wisdom is justice and moderation in ordering states and families [Plato] |
9108 | From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham] |
6052 | Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn] |
6064 | Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn] |
6088 | Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn] |
9107 | A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham] |
6084 | 'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn] |
6085 | The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn] |
6083 | The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn] |
16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach] |
6086 | Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn] |
6087 | Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn] |
6051 | In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn] |
6055 | Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn] |
6059 | Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn] |
6042 | The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn] |
6067 | Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn] |
9106 | The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham] |
6069 | 'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn] |
6068 | We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn] |
9113 | Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham] |
6070 | Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn] |
9110 | The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham] |
6062 | Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn] |
6065 | We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn] |
6082 | If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn] |
6075 | Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn] |
1607 | Diotima said the Forms are the objects of desire in philosophical discourse [Plato, by Roochnik] |
15388 | Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham] |
9109 | If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham] |
6058 | Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn] |
6053 | Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn] |
6043 | Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn] |
6044 | Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn] |
6046 | Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn] |
6045 | It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn] |
6066 | Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn] |
6054 | Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn] |
6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
6049 | Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn] |
6048 | Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn] |
6050 | Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn] |
6080 | Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn] |
6079 | If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn] |
6081 | Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn] |
174 | True opinion without reason is midway between wisdom and ignorance [Plato] |
6071 | Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn] |
180 | We call a person the same throughout life, but all their attributes change [Plato] |
181 | Only the gods stay unchanged; we replace our losses with similar acquisitions [Plato] |
6077 | Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn] |
6074 | Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn] |
9105 | Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham] |
4026 | Beauty is harmony with what is divine, and ugliness is lack of such harmony [Plato] |
172 | Love of ugliness is impossible [Plato] |
173 | Beauty and goodness are the same [Plato] |
183 | Stage two is the realisation that beauty of soul is of more value than beauty of body [Plato] |
184 | Progress goes from physical beauty, to moral beauty, to the beauty of knowledge, and reaches absolute beauty [Plato] |
171 | Music is a knowledge of love in the realm of harmony and rhythm [Plato] |
176 | Love follows beauty, wisdom is exceptionally beautiful, so love follows wisdom [Plato] |
14177 | Love assists men in achieving merit and happiness [Plato] |
179 | Love is desire for perpetual possession of the good [Plato] |
177 | If a person is good they will automatically become happy [Plato] |
14178 | Happiness is secure enjoyment of what is good and beautiful [Plato] |
170 | The only slavery which is not dishonourable is slavery to excellence [Plato] |
182 | The first step on the right path is the contemplation of physical beauty when young [Plato] |
175 | Gods are not lovers of wisdom, because they are already wise [Plato] |
6072 | If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn] |
6073 | I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn] |