Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Summa totius logicae', 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity' and 'Defeasibility Theory'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
9108 From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
9107 A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
16300 Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
9106 The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
9113 Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
9110 The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
15388 Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
9109 If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
16421 Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
19718 Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19717 Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann]
19716 Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann]
19715 You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann]
19713 Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann]
19714 Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
19719 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
9105 Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham]