15 ideas
| 10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
| 9108 | From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham] |
| 10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
| 10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
| 9107 | A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham] |
| 19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach] |
| 9106 | The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham] |
| 9113 | Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham] |
| 9110 | The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham] |
| 15388 | Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham] |
| 9109 | If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham] |
| 17535 | Dispositionality has its own distinctive type of modality [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
| 9105 | Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham] |