Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Summa totius logicae', 'Identity and Necessity' and 'Causal Structuralism'

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25 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
9108 From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
9107 A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
16300 Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
9175 We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
9171 The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
9106 The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
9113 Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
9110 The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
15127 A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
15123 Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne]
15122 Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne]
15124 If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
15388 Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
15128 We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
15121 An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
9109 If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
9174 It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
9172 A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
9173 We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
9176 Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
9177 Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
9178 Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
9105 Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
15126 Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
15125 We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne]