32 ideas
9108 | From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham] |
18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
9107 | A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham] |
18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach] |
9106 | The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham] |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
9113 | Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham] |
9110 | The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham] |
18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
15388 | Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
9109 | If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
9105 | Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham] |