Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reportatio', 'Speaking of Objects' and 'Negation'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

23 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
18781 Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
18789 Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares]
18790 Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
18787 Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
18793 Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares]
18784 In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
18786 Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares]
18780 Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18782 The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
18783 Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
18792 Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
18785 Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
18788 For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
1630 We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract) [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
5747 "No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
7925 There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
13387 Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
8277 I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe on Quine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
18791 In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
1631 You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs [Quine]
1632 Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages [Quine]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
9111 God is not wise, but more-than-wise; God is not good, but more-than-good [William of Ockham]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
9112 We could never form a concept of God's wisdom if we couldn't abstract it from creatures [William of Ockham]