Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Action', 'Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic'' and 'The Individual, the State, and the Common Good'

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23 ideas

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
5163 Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
5167 The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
5164 A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer]
5165 Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer]
5166 The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
5162 Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
5168 Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
22251 Liberalism may fail because it neglects the shared nature of what we pursue and protect [Haldane]