Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Action', 'The Wealth of Nations' and 'Our Knowledge of the External World'

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
21584 A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
21572 Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
21571 Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell]
21574 Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell]
21587 Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
21582 Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
21573 When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
21588 Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
21586 The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
21585 The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
21684 Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / d. Negative facts
22316 A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
21576 With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
21575 When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
21580 Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / c. Unperceived sense-data
21583 When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
21577 Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
21579 Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
21578 Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
6416 Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
20991 People prepare our dinner from their own self-interest, not from humanity [Smith,A]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
20680 Selfish profit-seeking increases collective wealth, so greed is good, and egoism is altruism [Smith,A, by Harari]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
21581 We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell]