Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Action', 'How to Make our Ideas Clear' and 'Principle of Life and Plastic Natures'

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26 ideas

3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
7661 Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19089 Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
7660 We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
19419 Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
19421 Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls [Leibniz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
14906 Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
19420 Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
19416 Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz]
19422 Every particle of matter contains organic bodies [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
19418 Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover [Leibniz]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
19417 All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause [Leibniz]