Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Action', 'fragments/reports' and 'An Outline of Philosophy'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
20771 Six parts: dialectic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, theology [Cleanthes, by Diog. Laertius]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
6028 Bodies interact with other bodies, and cuts cause pain, and shame causes blushing, so the soul is a body [Cleanthes, by Nemesius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
20831 The soul suffers when the body hurts, creates redness from shame, and pallor from fear [Cleanthes]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
21740 I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
21741 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
21746 Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
21747 Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
21743 In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
21742 Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
21745 Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
21744 Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
22891 We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
5993 The ascending scale of living creatures requires a perfect being [Cleanthes, by Tieleman]