Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Action', 'Investigations into Logical Deduction' and 'Being You'

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23 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
13832 Natural deduction shows the heart of reasoning (and sequent calculus is just a tool) [Gentzen, by Hacking]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
23513 Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth]
23514 The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
23516 Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
23519 The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
23518 Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
23517 Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
23515 Human exceptionalism plagues biology, and most other human thinking [Seth]