Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Action', 'On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians' and 'The Passions of the Soul'

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27 ideas

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham]
There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
All qualities of bodies reduce to forces [Leibniz]
Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form [Leibniz]