32 ideas
19335 | Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz] |
16030 | 'Nominal' definitions identify things, but fail to give their essence [Jones,J-E] |
19367 | Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz] |
19351 | Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz] |
20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
19331 | Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz] |
20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
19346 | Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz] |
19340 | Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz] |
19366 | You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them [Leibniz] |
19326 | God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities [Leibniz] |
19327 | The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz] |
19344 | God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man [Leibniz] |
19330 | If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz] |
19325 | God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity [Leibniz] |
19329 | The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz] |
19437 | Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan [Leibniz] |
19337 | How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz] |
19345 | Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz] |