Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Action', 'The Human Condition' and 'Philosophy of Nature (Encylopedia II)'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

44 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
22077 Metaphysics is the lattice which makes incoming material intelligible [Hegel]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
20146 'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20169 An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes]
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
20149 To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
19738 Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes]
20145 Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
20170 Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
20165 Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes]
20171 Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes]
20175 If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
20174 Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
20159 Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes]
20161 The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes]
20156 We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes]
20150 There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes]
20158 Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
20151 Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes]
20152 Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes]
20153 Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
20162 Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
20157 Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes]
20154 Control is the key to well-being [Kekes]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
20172 Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes]
20173 Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
20155 Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
20164 The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes]
20163 Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
21756 All revolutions result from spirit changing its categories, to achieve a deeper understanding [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
20148 Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes]