Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Action', 'Logical Foundations of Probability' and 'Aboutness'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

30 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
18996 A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
19006 An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
18999 y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
19001 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
19002 A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
18998 Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
19004 Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
19007 A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
18993 If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo]
19003 Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
13048 Good explications are exact, fruitful, simple and similar to the explicandum [Carnap, by Salmon]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
18992 Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
18994 The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
18997 Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
19005 Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]