69 ideas
1887 | You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus] |
1885 | Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus] |
9572 | Realists about sets say there exists a null set in the real world, with no members [Chihara] |
9550 | We only know relational facts about the empty set, but nothing intrinsic [Chihara] |
9562 | In simple type theory there is a hierarchy of null sets [Chihara] |
9573 | The null set is a structural position which has no other position in membership relation [Chihara] |
9551 | What is special about Bill Clinton's unit set, in comparison with all the others? [Chihara] |
9549 | The set theorist cannot tell us what 'membership' is [Chihara] |
9571 | ZFU refers to the physical world, when it talks of 'urelements' [Chihara] |
9563 | A pack of wolves doesn't cease when one member dies [Chihara] |
12196 | A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus] |
9561 | The mathematics of relations is entirely covered by ordered pairs [Chihara] |
9552 | Sentences are consistent if they can all be true; for Frege it is that no contradiction can be deduced [Chihara] |
1902 | Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus] |
9553 | Analytic geometry gave space a mathematical structure, which could then have axioms [Chihara] |
10192 | We can replace existence of sets with possibility of constructing token sentences [Chihara, by MacBride] |
9559 | If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara] |
9566 | No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara] |
1889 | If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus] |
1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
1883 | How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus] |
1890 | We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus] |
1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
1874 | How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus] |
1878 | Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus] |
1880 | Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus] |
1877 | If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus] |
1879 | Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus] |
1876 | If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus] |
1911 | Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus] |
1910 | With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus] |
1886 | If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus] |
1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
9568 | I prefer the open sentences of a Constructibility Theory, to Platonist ideas of 'equivalence classes' [Chihara] |
9547 | Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara] |
20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
1900 | If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus] |
1899 | Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus] |
1901 | If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus] |
9574 | 'Gunk' is an individual possessing no parts that are atoms [Chihara] |
1903 | If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus] |
1904 | Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
1905 | How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus] |
1891 | How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus] |
1892 | The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus] |
1893 | If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus] |