33 ideas
| 17536 | If it can't be expressed mathematically, it can't occur in nature? [Heisenberg] |
| 17545 | Quantum theory shows that exact science does not need dogmatic realism [Heisenberg] |
| 17538 | Quantum theory does not introduce minds into atomic events [Heisenberg] |
| 17534 | A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg] |
| 17553 | We can retain the idea of 'substance', as indestructible mass or energy [Heisenberg] |
| 17544 | Basic particles have a mathematical form, which is more important than their substance [Heisenberg] |
| 7296 | 'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted] |
| 17550 | We give a mathematical account of a system of natural connections in order to clarify them [Heisenberg] |
| 20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 17549 | Seven theories in science: mechanics, heat, electricity, quantum, particles, relativity, life [Heisenberg, by PG] |
| 17540 | Energy is that which moves, and is the substance from which everything is made [Heisenberg] |
| 17541 | Energy is an unchanging substance, having many forms, and causing all change [Heisenberg] |
| 17548 | Maxwell introduced real fields, which transferred forces from point to point [Heisenberg] |
| 17533 | Radiation interference needs waves, but radiation photoelectric effects needs particles [Heisenberg] |
| 17532 | An atom's stability after collisions needs explaining (which Newton's mechanics can't do) [Heisenberg] |
| 17537 | Position is complementary to velocity or momentum, so the whole system is indeterminate [Heisenberg] |
| 17551 | It was formerly assumed that electromagnetic waves could not be a reality in themselves [Heisenberg] |
| 17543 | So-called 'empty' space is the carrier of geometry and kinematics [Heisenberg] |
| 17552 | In relativity the length of the 'present moment' is relative to distance from the observer [Heisenberg] |