12 ideas
18491 | The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because') [Künne] |
15544 | If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |
14594 | Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer] |
7024 | Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil] |
14595 | Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer] |
9478 | Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird] |
10729 | Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver] |
4031 | It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong] |
14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
10024 | The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes] |
10728 | A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver] |