22 ideas
18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
18491 | The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because') [Künne] |
18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |
18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
14375 | If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs] |
18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
14378 | Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs] |
12467 | Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs] |
18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
14377 | Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs] |
14376 | States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs] |
14379 | Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs] |
14372 | Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs] |
12466 | All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs] |
14371 | We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs] |
12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |
12464 | If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs] |
12469 | Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs] |
18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |