Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conceptions of Truth', 'Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and Essentialism' and 'Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal'

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6 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
18491 The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because') [Künne]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
17366 Virtually all modern views of speciation rest on relational rather than intrinsic features [Okasha]