8 ideas
| 15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
| 18491 | The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because') [Künne] |
| 15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
| 15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
| 15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
| 15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
| 15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
| 6382 | The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger] |