Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Nature of Mental States' and 'works'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner]
The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
If we succeed in speaking the truth, we cannot know we have done it [Xenophanes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
The basic Eleatic belief was that all things are one [Xenophanes, by Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Xenophanes said the essence of God was spherical and utterly inhuman [Xenophanes, by Diog. Laertius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Ethiopian gods have black hair, and Thracian gods have red hair [Xenophanes]
Mortals believe gods are born, and have voices and clothes just like mortals [Xenophanes]