24 ideas
18915 | If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen] |
18919 | There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen] |
18913 | Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen] |
18907 | Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen] |
18912 | Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen] |
18922 | Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen] |
18905 | Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen] |
18908 | Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen] |
7306 | If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A] |
18917 | Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen] |
18916 | Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen] |
18921 | Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen] |
7322 | Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A] |
7325 | Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A] |
7324 | Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A] |
18918 | Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen] |
7323 | If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A] |
18920 | 'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen] |
7315 | 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A] |
18906 | Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen] |
7328 | The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A] |
7329 | Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A] |
7333 | The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A] |
5845 | Niceratus learnt the whole of Homer by heart, as a guide to goodness [Xenophon] |