Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Symposium', 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content' and 'Being You'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth]
Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Human exceptionalism plagues biology, and most other human thinking [Seth]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Niceratus learnt the whole of Homer by heart, as a guide to goodness [Xenophon]