14 ideas
| 9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
| 23146 | Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver] |
| 9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
| 20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
| 9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
| 5845 | Niceratus learnt the whole of Homer by heart, as a guide to goodness [Xenophon] |
| 23144 | Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver] |
| 23148 | Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver] |
| 23150 | Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver] |
| 23147 | Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver] |
| 23149 | If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver] |