Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Symposium', 'The Nature of Existence vol.2' and 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
1627 Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
1623 Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
9204 Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17738 Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15200 How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
14761 Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
19492 Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
1628 If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
10929 Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12188 Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
15090 Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9383 Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine]
12424 Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9337 Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich]
9338 Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine]
9340 Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
1620 Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine]
1629 Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
19488 The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 6. Theory Holism
1625 Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
1626 It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
7317 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
1621 Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
9371 Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
9366 Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian]
14473 Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson]
7321 The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine]
8803 Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine]
17737 The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins]
1624 If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine]
1622 Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
5845 Niceratus learnt the whole of Homer by heart, as a guide to goodness [Xenophon]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
2608 For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
22936 A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
4231 Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
8591 There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
22935 The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
7802 A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle]
4230 A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe]
15199 The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]