31 ideas
| 10041 | Impredicative Definitions refer to the totality to which the object itself belongs [Gödel] |
| 14480 | Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson] |
| 21716 | In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B] |
| 10035 | Mathematical Logic is a non-numerical branch of mathematics, and the supreme science [Gödel] |
| 14471 | Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson] |
| 10042 | Reference to a totality need not refer to a conjunction of all its elements [Gödel] |
| 10038 | A logical system needs a syntactical survey of all possible expressions [Gödel] |
| 10046 | The generalized Continuum Hypothesis asserts a discontinuity in cardinal numbers [Gödel] |
| 10039 | Some arithmetical problems require assumptions which transcend arithmetic [Gödel] |
| 10043 | Mathematical objects are as essential as physical objects are for perception [Gödel] |
| 10045 | Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel] |
| 14493 | Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson] |
| 14491 | Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson] |
| 14489 | Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson] |
| 14485 | Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson] |
| 14487 | The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson] |
| 21651 | It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber] |
| 14486 | Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson] |
| 14467 | Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson] |
| 14479 | To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson] |
| 14481 | Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson] |
| 14482 | If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson] |
| 14483 | Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson] |
| 14476 | Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson] |
| 14477 | Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson] |
| 14478 | Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson] |
| 14466 | A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson] |
| 14475 | How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson] |
| 14474 | Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson] |
| 14488 | Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson] |
| 5845 | Niceratus learnt the whole of Homer by heart, as a guide to goodness [Xenophon] |