73 ideas
| 20801 | A wise man's chief strength is not being tricked; nothing is worse than error, frivolity or rashness [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
| 1771 | When shown seven versions of the mowing argument, he paid twice the asking price for them [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20770 | Philosophy has three parts, studying nature, character, and rational discourse [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 6022 | Someone who says 'it is day' proposes it is day, and it is true if it is day [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 16357 | Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati] |
| 7555 | Zeno achieved the statement of the problems of infinitesimals, infinity and continuity [Russell on Zeno of Citium] |
| 20860 | Whatever participates in substance exists [Zeno of Citium, by Stobaeus] |
| 15200 | How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
| 14761 | Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart] |
| 16360 | Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati] |
| 21397 | Perception an open hand, a fist is 'grasping', and holding that fist is knowledge [Zeno of Citium, by Long] |
| 20799 | A grasp by the senses is true, because it leaves nothing out, and so nature endorses it [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
| 16374 | There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati] |
| 20797 | If a grasped perception cannot be shaken by argument, it is 'knowledge' [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
| 21398 | A presentation is true if we judge that no false presentation could appear like it [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
| 1770 | When a slave said 'It was fated that I should steal', Zeno replied 'Yes, and that you should be beaten' [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 3799 | A dog tied to a cart either chooses to follow and is pulled, or it is just pulled [Zeno of Citium, by Hippolytus] |
| 21402 | Incorporeal substances can't do anything, and can't be acted upon either [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
| 20816 | A body is required for anything to have causal relations [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
| 18409 | Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati] |
| 16354 | Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati] |
| 16371 | Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati] |
| 16373 | Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati] |
| 16375 | Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati] |
| 16377 | Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati] |
| 16378 | An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati] |
| 16387 | Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati] |
| 16358 | The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati] |
| 16361 | A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati] |
| 16367 | There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati] |
| 16368 | Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati] |
| 16370 | A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati] |
| 16381 | The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati] |
| 16365 | Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati] |
| 1773 | A sentence always has signification, but a word by itself never does [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 16356 | There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati] |
| 16393 | In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati] |
| 16386 | Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati] |
| 16372 | Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati] |
| 16388 | We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati] |
| 16359 | Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati] |
| 16355 | Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati] |
| 16348 | Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati] |
| 16384 | Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati] |
| 16352 | A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati] |
| 16353 | Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati] |
| 16382 | Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati] |
| 16389 | If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati] |
| 16363 | Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati] |
| 16364 | Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati] |
| 16351 | In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati] |
| 16350 | Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati] |
| 16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |
| 20841 | Zeno said live in agreement with nature, which accords with virtue [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1774 | Since we are essentially rational animals, living according to reason is living according to nature [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 20863 | The goal is to 'live in agreement', according to one rational consistent principle [Zeno of Citium, by Stobaeus] |
| 2662 | Zeno saw virtue as a splendid state, not just a source of splendid action [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero] |
| 21395 | One of Zeno's books was 'That Which is Appropriate' [Zeno of Citium, by Long] |
| 5964 | Zeno says there are four main virtues, which are inseparable but distinct [Zeno of Citium, by Plutarch] |
| 20822 | There is no void in the cosmos, but indefinite void outside it [Zeno of Citium, by Ps-Plutarch] |
| 2608 | For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer] |
| 22936 | A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
| 4231 | Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe] |
| 8591 | There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart] |
| 22935 | The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
| 7802 | A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle] |
| 4230 | A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe] |
| 15199 | The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin] |
| 2648 | Things are more perfect if they have reason; nothing is more perfect than the universe, so it must have reason [Zeno of Citium] |
| 20811 | Since the cosmos produces what is alive and rational, it too must be alive and rational [Zeno of Citium] |
| 20810 | Rational is better than non-rational; the cosmos is supreme, so it is rational [Zeno of Citium] |
| 2649 | If tuneful flutes grew on olive trees, you would assume the olive had some knowledge of the flute [Zeno of Citium] |
| 20807 | The cosmos and heavens are the substance of god [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius] |