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All the ideas for 'works (fragments)', 'Logic for Philosophy' and 'Empty Names'

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77 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A wise man's chief strength is not being tricked; nothing is worse than error, frivolity or rashness [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
When shown seven versions of the mowing argument, he paid twice the asking price for them [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Philosophy has three parts, studying nature, character, and rational discourse [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Someone who says 'it is day' proposes it is day, and it is true if it is day [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
'Theorems' are formulas provable from no premises at all [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth tables assume truth functionality, and are just pictures of truth functions [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
In D we add that 'what is necessary is possible'; then tautologies are possible, and contradictions not necessary [Sider]
Intuitively, deontic accessibility seems not to be reflexive, but to be serial [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
System B introduces iterated modalities [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 is the strongest system, since it has the most valid formulas, because it is easy to be S5-valid [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 5. Epistemic Logic
Epistemic accessibility is reflexive, and allows positive and negative introspection (KK and K¬K) [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
We can treat modal worlds as different times [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
Converse Barcan Formula: □∀αφ→∀α□φ [Sider]
The Barcan Formula ∀x□Fx→□∀xFx may be a defect in modal logic [Sider]
System B is needed to prove the Barcan Formula [Sider]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
You can employ intuitionist logic without intuitionism about mathematics [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Maybe logical consequence is a primitive notion [Sider]
Maybe logical consequence is more a matter of provability than of truth-preservation [Sider]
The most popular account of logical consequence is the semantic or model-theoretic one [Sider]
Maybe logical consequence is impossibility of the premises being true and the consequent false [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
A 'theorem' is an axiom, or the last line of a legitimate proof [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
When a variable is 'free' of the quantifier, the result seems incapable of truth or falsity [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
A 'total' function must always produce an output for a given domain [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer]
Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
λ can treat 'is cold and hungry' as a single predicate [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
No assumptions in axiomatic proofs, so no conditional proof or reductio [Sider]
Good axioms should be indisputable logical truths [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
Induction has a 'base case', then an 'inductive hypothesis', and then the 'inductive step' [Sider]
Proof by induction 'on the length of the formula' deconstructs a formula into its accepted atoms [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Natural deduction helpfully allows reasoning with assumptions [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 6. Sequent Calculi
We can build proofs just from conclusions, rather than from plain formulae [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
The semantical notion of a logical truth is validity, being true in all interpretations [Sider]
It is hard to say which are the logical truths in modal logic, especially for iterated modal operators [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
In model theory, first define truth, then validity as truth in all models, and consequence as truth-preservation [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
In a complete logic you can avoid axiomatic proofs, by using models to show consequences [Sider]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Compactness surprisingly says that no contradictions can emerge when the set goes infinite [Sider]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Zeno achieved the statement of the problems of infinitesimals, infinity and continuity [Russell on Zeno of Citium]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
A single second-order sentence validates all of arithmetic - but this can't be proved axiomatically [Sider]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Whatever participates in substance exists [Zeno of Citium, by Stobaeus]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation [Sider]
A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification [Sider]
Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator [Sider]
We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings [Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
A relation is a feature of multiple objects taken together [Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The identity of indiscernibles is necessarily true, if being a member of some set counts as a property [Sider]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
'Strong' necessity in all possible worlds; 'weak' necessity in the worlds where the relevant objects exist [Sider]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Maybe metaphysical accessibility is intransitive, if a world in which I am a frog is impossible [Sider]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical truths must be necessary if anything is [Sider]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
'If B hadn't shot L someone else would have' if false; 'If B didn't shoot L, someone else did' is true [Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
Barcan Formula problem: there might have been a ghost, despite nothing existing which could be a ghost [Sider]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Perception an open hand, a fist is 'grasping', and holding that fist is knowledge [Zeno of Citium, by Long]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
A grasp by the senses is true, because it leaves nothing out, and so nature endorses it [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
If a grasped perception cannot be shaken by argument, it is 'knowledge' [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
A presentation is true if we judge that no false presentation could appear like it [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
When a slave said 'It was fated that I should steal', Zeno replied 'Yes, and that you should be beaten' [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
A dog tied to a cart either chooses to follow and is pulled, or it is just pulled [Zeno of Citium, by Hippolytus]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Incorporeal substances can't do anything, and can't be acted upon either [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
A body is required for anything to have causal relations [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
A sentence always has signification, but a word by itself never does [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Zeno said live in agreement with nature, which accords with virtue [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
Since we are essentially rational animals, living according to reason is living according to nature [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
The goal is to 'live in agreement', according to one rational consistent principle [Zeno of Citium, by Stobaeus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Zeno saw virtue as a splendid state, not just a source of splendid action [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
One of Zeno's books was 'That Which is Appropriate' [Zeno of Citium, by Long]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Zeno says there are four main virtues, which are inseparable but distinct [Zeno of Citium, by Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
There is no void in the cosmos, but indefinite void outside it [Zeno of Citium, by Ps-Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Since the cosmos produces what is alive and rational, it too must be alive and rational [Zeno of Citium]
Things are more perfect if they have reason; nothing is more perfect than the universe, so it must have reason [Zeno of Citium]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Rational is better than non-rational; the cosmos is supreme, so it is rational [Zeno of Citium]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
If tuneful flutes grew on olive trees, you would assume the olive had some knowledge of the flute [Zeno of Citium]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
The cosmos and heavens are the substance of god [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]