Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Attacks (frags)', 'The Mind and the Soul' and 'World and Essence'

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22 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
1507 We don't have time for infinite quantity, but we do for infinite divisibility, because time is also divisible [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
5109 The fast runner must always reach the point from which the slower runner started [Zeno of Elea, by Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
1512 Zeno is wrong that one grain of millet makes a sound; why should one grain achieve what the whole bushel does? [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 7. Paradoxes of Time
1508 Zeno's arrow paradox depends on the assumption that time is composed of nows [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
9295 Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
9293 Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
454 If there are many things they must have a finite number, but there must be endless things between them [Zeno of Elea]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
455 That which moves, moves neither in the place in which it is, nor in that in which it is not [Zeno of Elea]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
1511 If everything is in a place, what is the place in? Place doesn't exist [Zeno of Elea, by Simplicius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
9292 The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann]
9294 No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann]