36 ideas
2546 | Philosophy is a magnificent failure in its attempt to overstep the limits of our knowledge [McGinn] |
8956 | What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó] |
6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan] |
2544 | Thoughts have a dual aspect: as they seem to introspection, and their underlying logical reality [McGinn] |
6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan] |
6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan] |
6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan] |
8953 | Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó] |
6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan] |
6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan] |
6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan] |
6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan] |
6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
2539 | Mental modules for language, social, action, theory, space, emotion [McGinn] |
8954 | Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó] |
2545 | Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn] |
2543 | Brains aren't made of anything special, suggesting panpsychism [McGinn] |
6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan] |
6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan] |
6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan] |
6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan] |
6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan] |
6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan] |
6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan] |
2540 | Examining mind sees no brain; examining brain sees no mind [McGinn] |
6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan] |
6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan] |
6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan] |
6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan] |
8955 | Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó] |
2547 | There is information if there are symbols which refer, and which can combine into a truth or falsehood [McGinn] |
6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan] |
2542 | Causation in the material world is energy-transfer, of motion, electricity or gravity [McGinn] |
6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan] |