17 ideas
12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
8956 | What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó] |
12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
8953 | Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó] |
12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
8954 | Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó] |
17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
8955 | Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó] |
12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |