Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Nominalism', 'Introduction - Ontology' and 'On the Necessity of Origin'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


11 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Suppose a world where I'm from different gametes; add my gametes; which one is more me? [McGinn]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
McGinn falsely claims necessity of origin is a special case of the necessity of identity [Forbes,G on McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan]