13 ideas
| 19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
| 11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
| 19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
| 19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
| 19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
| 19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
| 11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
| 15675 | We don't condemn people for being bad at reasoning [Finlayson] |
| 15674 | One can universalise good advice, but that doesn't make it an obligation [Finlayson] |
| 15662 | The 'culture industry' is an advertisement for the way things are [Finlayson] |