15 ideas
| 19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
| 10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
| 10792 | The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
| 10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
| 10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
| 10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
| 19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
| 19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
| 19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
| 19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
| 19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
| 10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |